Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and
Communication
Volume 5 MEANING, UNDERSTANDING AND
KNOWLEDGE

Article 7

2009

Some Models of Linguistic Understanding
Guy Longworth
Warwick University, UK

Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Longworth, Guy (2009) "Some Models of Linguistic Understanding," Baltic International Yearbook of
Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 5. https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.284

This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open
access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook
of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information,
please contact cads@k-state.edu.

Some Models of Linguistic Understanding

The Baltic International Yearbook of
Cognition, Logic and Communication
October 2010
pages 1-56

Volume 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.284

GUY LONGWORTH
Warwick University, UK

SOME MODELS

OF

LINGUISTIC UNDERSTANDING1

ABSTRACT: I discuss the conjecture that understanding what
is said in an utterance is to be modelled as knowing what is said
in that utterance. My main aim is to present a number of alternative models, as a prophylactic against premature acceptance of
the conjecture as the only game in town. I also offer preliminary
assessments of each of the models, including the propositional
knowledge model, in part by considering their respective capacities to sub-serve the transmission of knowledge through testimony. In each case, the preliminary assessment is unfavourable.
I end by very briefly sketching an additional model as an object
for future consideration.
1. INTRODUCTION

It is natural to view linguistic understanding as, or as responsible for,
a constitutive alignment of mind with the linguistic expression of content. So viewed, linguistic understanding is some of what sustains the
abilities of some amongst the minded to take cognitive advantage of
some amongst the contentful. It therefore seems appropriate to pursue
the theory of understanding as a chapter of epistemology, construed as
aiming to provide an account of the nature, or natures, of such alignments between mind and world.
From that perspective, the most obvious starting point for a theory of understanding is the conjecture that linguistic understanding
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is a form of propositional, or factual, knowledge; more specifically,
the conjecture is that understanding is knowledge of facts about the
linguistic expression of content. If the conjecture was correct, then—
assuming that knowledge does not have a disjunctive nature—it would
allow for a partial reduction to two previous problems: the problem of
accounting for the facts about the linguistic expression of content and
the problem of providing a general account of knowledge of facts. And
the conjecture gains plausibility from elementary reflection on the pattern of ordinary thought about understanding. For we ordinarily find
plausible that when an auditor has understood what a speaker has said
(/what their words mean), the auditor knows what the speaker has
said (/what their words mean). And we ordinarily find plausible that
someone knows what a speaker has said (/what their words mean)
just in case, for some fact or facts to the effect that the speaker has said
that such-and-such (/that their words have such-and-such a meaning),
they know that the speaker has said that such-and-such (/that their
words have such-and-such a meaning). Of course, ordinary acceptance
of such implications doesn’t decide the status of the conjecture. For one
thing, our ordinary judgments about cases may be erroneous, or less
fine-grained than further reflection demands. For another, our task is
to explain what it is to understand, and not simply what happens to be
the case whenever we do. Nevertheless, the conjunction of naturalness
and plausibility lends some credence to the opening conjecture.
Beyond that conjunction, a variety of considerations might be offered for or against the conjecture.2 Perhaps the most compelling consideration in favour of the conjecture is the thought that it provides the
only viable model of understanding. The main brief of this paper is to
present some alternative models with the aim of preventing our being
swayed prematurely towards the conjectured model by (premature)
thought of its being the only game in town. (Section 2.) A secondary
aim is to attempt a preliminary assessment of the various models I
shall present. In the course of attempting that, I shall consider one
important consideration that has been presented in favour of the opening conjecture. (Section 4.) The consideration arises from reflection
on the role of understanding in facilitating the testimonial transmission of knowledge from speaker to auditor. In preliminary form, the
consideration is that there seem to be cases in which an audience’s un-
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derstanding could only facilitate their acquisition of knowledge from
others in the way that it does if it were itself a form of propositional
knowledge. Driving the consideration is the thought that, if understanding had some other, lesser epistemic status, then it would impose
that status as a higher bound on cognitions acquired on its basis, and
so preclude the transmission of knowledge. In response, I shall argue for two claims. First, I shall argue that the mooted consideration
fails to support the conjecture over some of the other plausible models of understanding. (Section 5.) Second, I shall argue that none of
the candidate models copes satisfactorily with the needs of testimonial
knowledge transmission. (Sections 6-8.) I end with the hope that that
result might provoke interest in a further alternative. (Section 9.)
2.

Some Models of Linguistic Understanding

(3)

(4)

VARIETIES OF UNDERSTANDING

There are many varieties of broadly linguistic understanding. For
present purposes, I shall distinguish six varieties, along two dimensions. First, we can distinguish the standing meanings of sentence
types—e.g. the meaning common to all instances of the type of English sentence “I am here, now”—and the various speech acts that
speakers can use those sentences in order to perform—e.g. asserting
that, or asking whether, they are there, then. On that basis, we can
distinguish understanding of meaning from understanding of (determinates of the determinable) what is said. Second, we can distinguish amongst the following forms of understanding: the standing
abilities, or dispositions, of speakers that enable them on occasion
to understand—what I’ve elsewhere labelled ability-understanding;
the episodes in which speakers exercise those abilities successfully—
achievement-understanding; and the states that speakers enter on the
basis of those episodes—state-understanding.3 Thus, we can distinguish
at least the following six varieties of understanding:
(1) Ability-understanding of meaning. Understanding as
an ability, capacity, or disposition, to understand the
meaning of a sentence type—e.g. one’s having facility
with the words and forms that constitute that type.
(2) Achievement-understanding of meaning. Understanding as an episode in which the ability in (1) is
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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exercised successfully—e.g. one’s coming to stateunderstand, or understanding, the meaning of a presented sentence type.
State-understanding of meaning. Understanding as a
state entered through successful exercise of the ability
in (1)—e.g. one’s being in a state of understanding,
or having achievement-understood, the meaning of a
presented sentence type.
Ability-understanding of what is said. Understanding
as an ability, capacity, or disposition, to understand
what is said (e.g. what is asserted, asked, ordered,
optated, etc.)—e.g. one’s having facility with the ways
in which words and forms, or sentence types, can be
used in order to perform various speech acts with particular contents.
Achievement-understanding of what is said. Understanding as an episode in which the ability in (4) is
exercised successfully—e.g. one’s coming to stateunderstand, or understanding, what someone has
said.
State-understanding of what is said. Understanding as
a state entered through successful exercise of the ability in (4)—e.g. one’s being in a state of understanding, or having achievement-understood, what someone has said.

Obviously, there is more to be said about the distinctions sketched here,
and there is space for challenges to arise concerning either the necessity
or sufficiency of this particular six-fold classification. In the remainder,
I shall focus upon (4)-(6), so forms of understanding targeted upon
what is said, rather than sentence meaning.4 What matters for present
purposes about the remaining three-fold classification is that it is at
least plausible that there is such a thing, or way for a thing to be, as
state-understanding. For it is plausible that state-understanding is the
primary candidate for identification with propositional knowledge of
what is said.
Talk about propositional knowledge shuns the type of temporal
modification found with talk about episodes, and embraces that found
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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with talk about states, so that (7) and (8), by contrast with (9) and
(10), are ill-formed, or take unintended ‘came to know’/‘came to be a
smoker’ readings:
(7) *Florence knew [the answer/that smoking is addictive] in about a week.
(8) *Florence was a smoker in about a week.
(9) Florence knew [the answer/that smoking is addictive] for about a week.
(10) Florence was a smoker for about a week.
And talk about propositional knowledge, unlike talk about processes and process-involving episodes, lacks a distinctive present tense
progressive form. Insofar as it has a reading, (11) is equivalent to (12),
so lacks the distinctive reading seen in (13) and (14):
(11) ?Florence is knowing [the answer/that smoking is a
habit].
(12) Florence knows [the answer/that smoking is a habit].
(13) Florence is smoking.
(14) Florence is smoking the whole packet.
Modulo the usual reservations concerning transitions from features
of the linguistic record to an associated metaphysics, there is therefore some reason to classify cases of propositional knowledge as states,
rather than as episodes or processes. In that case, although it is left
open that one’s enjoying achievement-understanding might be one’s
coming to have propositional knowledge, there is reason to reject the
conjecture that achievement-understanding is propositional knowledge.
The same type of consideration cannot be used in order to undermine the conjecture that ability-understanding might be propositional knowledge. For the temporal profile of ability-understanding
is closely akin to that of propositional knowledge.5 However, some
ground for doubt is provided by reflection on the comparative immediacy with which propositional knowledge, by contrast with abilityunderstanding, can determine judgement, or other forms of occurrent
cognition. To a good first approximation, one’s knowing that such-andsuch can determine that one is disposed to judge that such-and-such
without first determining that one enters any other cognitive state, or
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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that one judges anything else.6 By contrast, one’s possession of abilityunderstanding can determine that one is disposed to judge, for instance, that someone has said that such-and-such, only by first determining that one attains state- or achievement-understanding. (One’s
so judging might be the attainment of either state- or achievementunderstanding.) To the extent that that is correct, it suggests that,
insofar as ability-understanding is associated with propositional knowledge, the association is indirect. Moreover, it suggests that theoretical grounds for associating ability-understanding with propositional knowledge will vary in force with grounds for thinking that
the characteristic outputs of ability-understanding, instances of stateunderstanding, are themselves instances of propositional knowledge.7
Neither consideration is, as it stands, decisive. But together they
serve to make it plausible that the primary form of the opening conjecture is that state-understanding is a form of propositional knowledge.
That is anyway the form of the opening conjecture that I shall stalk
in the remainder. I turn now to sketching some competing models of
state understanding. Henceforth, I shall use ‘understanding’, unless
otherwise specified, to abbreviate ‘state-understanding’.
The schematic form of the facts onto which understanding is directed can be specified as in (15), with ‘S’ instanced by terms for
speakers, ‘said’ instanced by determinate speech act predicates, and
‘p’ instanced by appropriate clausal complements.
(15) S said p.
For two instances,
(16) Florence suggested that smoking is not addictive.
(17) Kim asked whether Florence’s suggestion was insincere.
The facts schematised in this way each have three obvious components,
signalled in (18)-(20):
(18) An action by S: S’s production of an utterance u.
(19) The content canonically characterised by the clausal
complement, p.
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(20) An expressive relation between action/product and
content.
Corresponding to the fact in (15), and its proper sub-components in
(18)-(20), are the following four schematic models of understanding,
with ‘A’ instanced by auditors and ‘Φ’ by specific attitude types:
(PU) A Φs that S (/produced u and thereby) said p.
(OU) A Φs p.
(UU) A Φs u (/the production of u).
(RU) A Φs the expressive relation between u (/the production of u) and p.8
Obviously, ‘Φ’ might be instanced in a wide variety of ways in each
schematic model. I shall restrict attention here to broadly epistemic
models, models that aim to characterise understanding either as a case
of propositional knowledge, or as constitutively connected with propositional knowledge. Even with that restriction in force, the imposition
of order is disrupted by the fact that propositional knowledge can itself
take a wide variety of more specific forms, and can be constitutively
connected, in a panoply of ways, with a menagerie of other forms of
cognition. Four slightly more specific models that emerge from attending within the restriction are as follows, where the subscript ‘W ’ signals
the possibility of further specification of a way, or form, of knowing or
cognizing, and it is assumed that all the forms of cognition involved
are, or are constitutively connected with, forms of propositional knowledge.
(PK) A knowsw that S said p.
(OK) A knowsw [/is acquaintedw with] the content or proposition p.
(UK) A knowsw [/has apprehendedw /is acquaintedw with]
u (/the production of u).
(RK) A knowsw [/is epistemically sensitivew to] an expressive relation between u (/the production of u) and p.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(PK) is a determinable version of the model proposed in our opening
conjecture. (OK), (UK), and (RK) provide the bases for determinable
alternatives to that conjecture. Notice that each of the models imposes
further background requirements on the understanding subjects’ possession, and exercise, of cognitive and perceptual abilities. It is plausible that (PK) requires that the subject, A, perceives an utterance by
S and cognizes both the proposition that S said p and the proposition
p; that (OK) requires that A cognizes p; that (UK) requires that A perceives u (/the production of u); and that (RK) requires an ability to
perceive u (/the production of u) and an ability to cognize p. Ultimately, an account of understanding will have to include accounts of
all the sub-abilities on which understanding depends, in effect an account of the matter of understanding. Prior to that, however, is the
present target: an account of the form of understanding. Further details about how each of the models of the form of understanding may
be developed will emerge as we progress.
3. UNDERSTANDING AND (UK)

I shall begin with what is apt to seem the least plausible model, (UK).
Paul Ziff presents at least one version of (UK) in the following passage:
To understand what is said, in the sense of understanding
the utterance uttered, is (not so simply) to hear and make
out the utterance. Thus if from the lecture platform one
asks students at the rear of the room ‘Can you understand
what is said?’, the answer is yes if they can hear and make
out the words: thus even Heidegger can hope to be understood. (Ziff 1970: 15)
I shall assume that Ziff here aims to characterise minimal conditions
on state-understanding, rather than minimal conditions on abilityunderstanding. According to one reading, Ziff’s proposal is that stateunderstanding an utterance is a matter merely of hearing an utterance
and ‘making out’—perhaps by recognising or categorising as words—
the words that it instances. So construed, the proposal is extremely
implausible. For on that reading, Heidegger might reasonably hope to
be understood even if he were knowingly to speak German to an audience of monolingual English speakers, assuming only that they had
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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been trained to recognize or categorise as such the German words that
he used.
A second construal avoids the immediate difficulty with the first
by adding a requirement to the effect that ‘not so simply’ hearing and
making out an utterance involves recognition of relevant semantical—
or more broadly, content expressive—features of the words used in the
utterance. It would then be a requirement on adequate specification
of the proposal that it went beyond the minimal account (UK) by incorporating an explicit account of what the latter itself involves: an
account, that is, of the recognition of broadly semantical features of
words. The obvious risk attending this departure from (UK) is that appeal to a more basic form of state-understanding, to be accounted for
by one of the other models, is thereby smuggled into the account.
A third construal aims to avoid that obvious risk by refusing to specify the required background or context against which understanding
takes place by appeal to state-understanding. The core of Ziff’s proposal, so read, is that state-understanding of an utterance—occupancy
of which state distinguishes those who understand the utterance from
those who don’t—is a matter simply of apprehending the utterance
against the not so simple background of a specific type of cognitive or
non-cognitive ability.9
So construed, Ziff’s proposal belongs to a tradition of deflationary attempts to minimise the specific cognitive burdens that attend utterance understanding.10 A central goal of the deflationary tradition
is to treat states, or episodes, of understanding as determined by the
obtaining or occurrence within a special context, or against a special
background, of states, or episodes that do not involve cognition of the
expression of content—e.g. to treat them as broadly perceptual states
or episodes. Michael Dummett states the central deflationary thesis as
follows, attributing it to Wittgenstein:
[G]iven you understand the language, that you are, as it
were, in that state of understanding, nothing need happen, in which your understanding of the sentence consists,
no act of understanding, other than your hearing that sentence. (Dummett (1993ba): 99)11
Reflexes of the tradition vary according to whether they view the
relevant context, or background, as itself involving (potential for) cogwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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nition of the expression of content, and according to the specific views
that they embed concerning the determinants of understanding on
an occasion—whether, for example, they view those determinants as
merely sense-perceptual. The common thread running through the tradition is the shared view that the specific difference between someone
who understands an utterance, and someone who does not, need not
depend upon a specific difference in their cognition of the expression
of content: with the right context or background in place, coming to
understand an utterance can be a matter, for instance, simply of coming into perceptual relation with it. Although Ziff does very little to
elucidate the required context, or background, of understanding, it is
plausible that he means the parenthetical qualifier, ‘not so simply’, to
signal the place for such an account.
Defence of such a deflationary account of understanding requires
defence of the claim that exercises of ability understanding have no reflex in episodic or stative cognition of the expression of content. Dummett makes plain the main obstacle such a defence must surmount:
If [the claim that there is no genuine occurrent sense of
“understand”] could be successfully maintained, the conception of understanding an utterance could be reduced to
that of hearing it, while possessing a dispositional understanding of the words and the construction it employs. But
it is difficult to see how it can be maintained that no occurrent notion of understanding is required: for it is possible
to be perplexed by a sentence on first hearing, through a
failure to take in its structure, and to attain an understanding of it on reflection. (Dummett (1993a): 102-3)
Dummett’s worry is well taken. However, it is not quite decisive against
the deflationist’s proposal as understood here. For it is open to the deflationist to allow that understanding can take a definite occurrent, or
stative, form, and even that it can take a form involving definite cognitive changes in the subject of understanding. What the deflationist
is committed to denying is that any such changes are a matter of the
subject’s first-order cognition of the expression of content.
The deflationist reading of Ziff’s proposal leaves open a number of
options for further specification. The most important decision point
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concerns the required context or background for state-understanding.
Here, there are three broad options: first, one might seek to provide
an account of the context or background by appeal to potential for
some form of cognition of the expression of content; second, one might
provide an account by appeal to extra-cognitive factors, for instance
membership in a linguistic community; third, one might provide an
account by appeal to cognitive factors not involving cognition of the
expression of content. I shall take these options in order.
Although he is not part of the deflationary tradition, Frege provides
a useful sketch of a version of the first option:
When we use the word “integral”, for example, are we always conscious of everything that belongs to the sense of
this word? Only in very rare cases, I think. Usually, just
the word is present to our consciousness, though associated with a more or less dim knowledge that this word is
a sign that has a sense, and that, when we wish, we can
recall this sense. . . . This sign serves us as a receptacle in
which we can, as it were, carry the sense about, in the consciousness that we can always open this receptacle should
we have need of what it contains. (Frege (1914/1979):
209).
From the deflationary perspective, what is attractive about Frege’s
sketch is its articulation of a way in which one might count as understanding an utterance (or inscription) of a particular word if one
met two conditions: first, one knew that one had the ability to
bring to consciousness the sense of a word—as content of stative or
episodic cognition—and, so, since propositional knowledge is factive,
one possessed the ability; second, the word itself was present to one’s
consciousness—presumably, through perception, memory, or imagination. In effect, the proposal amounts to a combination of (UK) either
with a dispositional form of (OK), involving appeal to an epistemically appropriate disposition to entertain expressed content, or with a
dispositional form of (PK), involving appeal to a disposition to acquire
knowledge that the word expresses that content. In effect, then, Frege’s
proposal combined (UK) with a form of (RK).12
The main problem with Frege’s sketch, from the deflationary perspective, is that—as it stands—it requires completion with an account
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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of the ability to which it makes central appeal: the ability to bring to
consciousness the sense of a word. Frege can be read as making appeal to either of two abilities. One is the ability to bring occurrently to
mind—for instance, in judgement, or processive thinking—the sense,
or content, expressed by a word. Plausibly, such an ability would have
to co-occur with stative cognition, as when belief or knowledge gives
rise to judgement. On that reading, Frege’s aim would be articulation
of a model of the role of stative cognition in the determination of occurrent consciousness, rather than articulation of a deflationary model
of state-understanding. On the second reading, the ability to which
Frege appeals is the ability to enjoy stative cognition of the sense of a
word. Although that reading of Frege’s sketch makes it relevant to the
deflationary project, it offers the project limited support. First, it reveals that completion of the sketch would require the addition of, and
so cannot do duty for, an account of state-understanding as directed
onto the expression of content. Second, in revealing that requirement,
it makes obvious, through comparison with the missing component,
that what Frege here sketches is a model, not of state-understanding,
but rather of a specific form of ability-understanding.13
The initial plausibility of a deflationary take on Frege’s sketch derives from the fact that two subjects might possess the same general
ability-understanding of a word or sentence—so might both have the
ability to understand (uses of) that word or sentence—and yet differ in that one, and not the other, is conscious of a particular occurrence of the word or sentence in an utterance or inscription. In certain circumstances, it would be natural to characterise the difference
between the two subjects as a difference in understanding. And one
might then seek to identify that difference with a difference in their
respective enjoyment of state-understanding. However, a less demanding alternative characterisation of the difference between the two subjects is available. Although the two subjects differ, their difference is
confined to a difference in ability-understanding: while both subjects
ability-understand the types of word or sentence instanced in the utterance, only the instance-conscious subject ability-understands the particular instance or the particular utterance. Rather than furnishing a
model on which the role of state-understanding is usurped by abilityunderstanding and perception, Frege’s sketch serves only to provide
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grounds for distinguishing the generic ability to understand what is
said by use of utterances of a particular type from the specific ability to
understand what is said in a particular instance of that type.
The upshot to this point is that the proponent of a deflationary
form of (UK) should aim to account for both the foreground trigger
to state-understanding, and the background against which that trigger operates, without appeal to cognition of the expression of content.
The standing risk that attends pursuit of that aim is that, in avoiding
substantial commitment to cognition of the expression of content, the
combined account of trigger and background will be insufficiently substantial to capture state-understanding and will, at best, capture only
a form of ability-understanding.
We can get a better sense of the dangers in this area by considering
a deflationary account that aims to appeal only to non-cognitive factors. On one salient interpretation, David Kaplan sketches a version of
such a view in the following passage:
To use language we need a special relation (I hesitate to
call it epistemological) to the linguistic representations. I
think that this special relation simply is what is commonly
called linguistic comprehension or understanding. And I
tend to think that comprehension is primarily a matter
of one’s standing within a linguistic community. (Kaplan
(2005): 998)14
The brevity of Kaplan’s sketch means that it is open to multiple interpretations, even in context. Two of these, either of which may be
the intended interpretation, can be set aside for present purposes. According to the first, Kaplan’s aim is limited to gesturing towards an account of a form of ability-understanding—the power to ‘use language’.
According to the second, Kaplan’s aim is to distinguish his preferred
account of understanding, on which the cognition involved in understanding encompasses only representational features of linguistic vehicles, from an account that he finds in Bertrand Russell’s work, on
which the cognition involved in understanding encompasses—through
acquaintance—the elements determined by those representational features. It is the third, and possibly unintended, interpretation that bears
on the present discussion. According to the third interpretation, the

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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background required in order that a subject’s apprehension of an utterance can suffice for state-understanding is limited to their standing
within a linguistic community.
Even on the third interpretation, the bearing of Kaplan’s suggestion on the status of deflationary accounts of understanding depends
upon its further specification. In particular, it depends upon whether
the specification of necessary conditions on standing within a linguistic community, and the further conditions for which that standing suffices, are themselves cognitive and, if cognitive, are themselves forms
of state-understanding. However, once that requirement on deflationary bearing is made clear, it becomes obvious that any account able to
meet it will be highly implausible. Indeed, it becomes clear that on
its (perhaps unintended) third interpretation, Kaplan’s proposal gains
whatever plausibility it has from the fact that standing within a linguistic community typically both requires, and also makes available, a
substantive repertoire of cognitive resources.
Consider, for example, a straightforward case wherein one’s standing within a linguistic community might fail to make available cognition of the content expressed by an utterance, an ordinary English
speaker’s take on my inscription of sentence (21):
(21) Ptarmigans lour.
Although (21) is a piece of more or less ordinary English, many ordinary English speakers would fail to cognize either the meaning of, or
what is said by the use of, this sentence. By any normal standards,
such ordinary English speakers would fail to enjoy state-understanding
of (my use of) (21). Now since ordinary English speakers often have
access to extra-ordinary speakers, dictionaries, and the like, it is often
possible for them to acquire the required cognition, and so to come to
have state-understanding. Thus, such a speaker might be informed that
(21) means Arctic grouses appear dark and threatening. In a somewhat
attenuated sense, then, we might be willing, prior to their consultation
of sources, to ascribe to them ability-understanding of (21) (or perhaps
the ability to acquire ability-understanding). However, our willingness
to ascribe to such speakers ability-understanding does nothing to undermine our unwillingness to ascribe to them state-understanding.
Alternatively, in some contexts, we might allow that appropriate engagement with competent speakers can put an ordinary English speaker
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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in a position to enjoy vicarious cognition of content expressed by (21).
Compare the following sort of case, described by Gareth Evans:

My understanding an utterance u as [assertion-like] saying
that P puts me in a position

A group of people are having a conversation in a pub,
about a certain Louis of whom S has never heard before.
S becomes interested and asks: ‘What did Louis do then?’
There seems to be no question but that S denotes a particular man and asks about him. Or on some subsequent
occasion S may use the name to offer some new thought to
one of the participants: ‘Louis was quite right to do that.’
Again he clearly denotes whoever was the subject of conversation in the pub. (Evans (1973): 6-7)

(a) to know that P, in the event of my coming to know
that u is true;
(b) to know that u is true, in the event of my coming to
know that P;
(c) to know that u is false, in the event of my coming to
know that not P; and
(d) to know that not P, in the event of my coming to know
that u is false.

It is plausible, not only that S is in a position to denote, so talk about,
Louis, but also that S is able to think about Louis, to cognize, for example, the content that Louis was quite right to undertake a particular course of action, at least while S is in conversational contact with
autonomously competent speakers. And similar claims would be plausible had the conversation turned to the appearance of ptarmigans.
The fact that standing in a linguistic community can, in appropriate
circumstances, put one in a position vicariously to enjoy cognition,
and the fact that it can furnish one with an attenuated form of abilityunderstanding, conspire to give the deflationary interpretation of Kaplan’s sketch a plausibility that it would otherwise lack. Once it is
cleanly separated from the more plausible positions that surround it,
its plausibility lapses.
The third option for a deflationist account of understanding involves the attempt to provide an account of understanding by appeal to
cognitive factors not involving cognition of the expression of content.
This is the option taken up in recent work by Ian Rumfitt. According to
Rumfitt, understanding an utterance is:
. . . a second-order cognitive capacity: [in the case of uptake of assertion-like sayings] one who possesses it is in a
capacity to gain new knowledge from old (Rumfitt (2005):
444).15
Specifically,
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Understanding a[n assertion-like] saying, in other words,
allows knowledge to spread back and forth between the
saying’s content and attributions of truth to it, and between that content’s negation and attributions of falsity to
the saying (Rumfitt (2005): 443).16
Like Frege’s proposal, Rumfitt’s proposal combined (UK) with a form of
(RK), according to which understanding an utterance is a matter of a
specific type of sensitivity to the expressive relation between a particular utterance and its content. Rumfitt’s proposal differs from Frege’s in
that the outputs of exercises of the background ability, or capacity, to
which his proposal appeals do not—except in special cases17 —involve
the cognition of the expression of content by an utterance, i.e. firstorder responsiveness to the fact that that content was expressed by
an utterance. Rather, on Rumfitt’s proposal, the outputs of exercises
of one’s understanding involve cognition—specifically, knowledge—
either of the proposition expressed by an utterance (/the negation
of that proposition) or of the proposition that the utterance is true
(/false). The deflationary credentials of Rumfitt’s proposal derive, therefore, from the fact that the proposal makes no appeal to a distinctive
form of first-order cognition of the expression of content.
Rumfitt’s proposal, and in particular the specific form of (RK) that
it implements, is obviously superior to the other deflationary accounts
that we have considered to this point. Proper assessment of the proposal demands comparison with its major competitors, (PK) and (OK).
I shall pursue comparison of the three extant views by considering their
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relative capacity to sub-serve explanation of the transmission of knowledge via testimony.
4. TESTIMONY AND UNDERSTANDING

According to John Locke, speech is
. . . the common Conduit, whereby the Improvements of
knowledge are conveyed from one Man, and one generation to another. (Locke (1689): III, xi.1).18
Gareth Evans argues for a connection between that view of the nature of linguistic capacity and the present topic. He writes:
. . . [I]t is a fundamental, though insufficiently recognized,
point that communication is essentially a mode of the transmission of knowledge. In application to the case we are
particularly interested in, this means that, if the speaker S
has knowledge of x to the effect that it is F, and in consequence utters a sentence in which he refers to x, and says
of it that it is F, and if his audience hears and understands
the utterance, and accepts it as true (and there are no defeating conditions), then A himself thereby comes to know of
x that it is F. (Evans (1982): 310-311)
He continues:
If we are prepared to take for granted our grasp of the
semantical concepts which this principle employs, we can
use it to yield epistemological dividends. But it is possible to use the principle the other way round, bringing our
intuitions about knowledge to bear upon the explicitly semantical concepts—the concepts of reference, saying, and
understanding—in the middle. We shall then be thinking of communication as a relation between speaker and
hearer which can constitute a link in a chain of knowledgetransmission. We already show tacit appreciation of this
point when, looking at the link from the hearer’s point of
view, we typically gloss understanding as knowing what
the speaker is saying. . . (Evans (1982): 311).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Evans’ talk of a typical gloss here suggests reticence in endorsing that
gloss. But he in fact appears to assume both that the gloss is to be
accepted and that it is to be understood in an especially demanding
way. For the passage just quoted is taken to support the following:
The audience must proceed. . . to the right (i.e. intended)
interpretation. And if he is to be credited with understanding, he must know that it is the right interpretation. (Evans
(1982): 310).
Evans appears here to present a remarkably strong form of a model of
understanding in the ballpark of (PK).19 Where (PK) demands of one
who understands only that they know what was said, Evans imposes
the dual requirements that one who understands (i) ‘proceeds to the
right interpretation’ and (ii) knows that the interpretation to which
they proceed is the right one.20 Michael Dummett presents a similar
dual component model of the form of cognition required for communication in the following passage:
If language is to serve as a medium of communication, it
is not sufficient that a sentence should in fact be true under the interpretation placed on it by one speaker just in
case it is true under that placed on it by another; it is also
necessary that both speakers should be aware of the fact.
(Dummett (1978): 132)21
Reflection on the structure shared by Evans’ and Dummett’s proposals occasions four important questions. The first question—already
raised by reflection on some of the models considered above—is, does
state-understanding have a plurality of psychological components or
attendants? We’ve already considered the suggestion that it does, via
considering models on which the cognition involved in understanding
itself depends upon other forms of cognition or perception. But Evans’
proposal raises the question in an especially pressing form by indicating the possibility that state-understanding may involve more than one
of our candidate models, (PK)-(RK). Given an affirmative answer to
the first question, the second question is, how are the components or
attendants of understanding ordered? The second question itself fragments into questions of constitutive, explanatory, and epistemological
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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order. Is one or another component partly constitutive of the other
components? Does one or another component play a role in explaining
the occurrence of the others? Does one or another component serve
as epistemological ground for, or otherwise underwrite the epistemic
standing of, the others? The third question—also presupposing an affirmative answer to the first—is, how, if at all, are the components
or attendants of understanding integrated with one another? Are the
components more or less independent occupants of the mind, or are
they integrated elements in a larger structure? The fourth question
concerns one rationale for an affirmative answer to the first, and offers
one way of dealing with the second and third: are some, or all, of the
tasks that Evans and Dummett distribute across multiple-components
in fact carried out by a single component? For example, is the work
performed, in their models, by a combination of the placing of a correct (/shared) interpretation together with knowledge that the interpretation is correct (/shared), really the work of a single element. Is
the epistemic load that is borne, in their models, by knowledge that
an interpretation of a speaker is correct (/shared) in fact shouldered
by simple possession of knowledge that the speaker has said that suchand-such, or by some other single cognitive state or capacity? This is
not the forum for detailed pursuit of these important questions, but
they will play some role in shaping comparative assessment of our candidate models. For present purposes, we will view Evans’ argument
sketch as intended to support (PK), rather than the putatively more demanding model that he in fact proposes, on the assumption that (PK)
is able to carry the epistemic load of his mixed model.
Returning to Evans’ argument sketch, its first step is the remarkably
strong claim that ‘communication is essentially a mode of the transmission of knowledge’ (Evans (1982): 310). That step might be questioned on a variety of grounds. For instance, it might be argued that
communication can have taken place where only belief comes to be
shared by speaker and audience; and it might be argued that the most
basic function of linguistic communication is the spread of affection,
rather than cognition. However, the initial stage of Evans’ argument
appears to depend only on a slightly weaker claim: that linguistic communication can, in some circumstances, be a mode of—so can suffice
for—the transmission of knowledge. The second step is then required
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to be that hearing, understanding, and responding appropriately to
what one hears and understands—for instance, by accepting what is
asserted—can suffice, in the same circumstances, for communication
and, hence, for the transmission of knowledge.
It is important that, in assessing the second step of Evans’ argument, one focuses initially on cases in which knowledge is transmitted
via linguistic communication, and considers, in those cases, the functional importance of understanding, rather than beginning with the
functional elements that Evans lists—i.e. the speaker saying p as a
consequence of knowing p, the audience hearing, understanding, and
accepting as true the speaker’s utterance, and there being no defeating
conditions. For otherwise, Evans’ claim that the combination of functional elements that he lists suffices for the transmission of knowledge
is liable to be crowded out by a range of putative counterexamples. I
shall mention three types of counterexample, all forms of what might
be called epistemic cul-de-sacs.22
First, the only requirement that Evans imposes on the connection
between the speaker’s knowledge and their utterance is that the speaker
says p ’as a consequence’ of knowing p.23 But if we allow for sufficiently
deviant relations of consequence-so that, for instance, the speaker intends to speak falsely, but fulfilment of their intention is disrupted by
their knowledge and they accidentally give voice to a proposition‘ that
they also know—then it is plausible that knowledge could not thereby
be transmitted, at least via what was, from that point on, a normal
route.
Second, and related, someone might speak as a normal consequence
of their knowledge, but be in such danger of speaking falsely, that—due
to safety or reliability conditions on knowledge—the audience could
not acquire knowledge on the basis of their acceptance of what the
speaker says. For instance, consider Sal, a non-native English speaker
who knows that it is raining, and uses English to say so, while—since
the weather is closely approaching snow—it might very easily have
been snowing rather than raining. We can suppose that Sal is sufficiently sensitive to weather conditions that there is little danger that,
had it been snowing, Sal would anyway have believed that it was raining. The nearby possibility of snow is therefore no bar to Sal’s knowing
that it is raining. However, Sal’s non-native competence with English
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is in certain respects very fragile. In particular, Sal would incorrectly
have applied the word ‘rain’ to the sort of snow that is in great danger
of occurring. In that case, it is plausible that one could not acquire
knowledge from Sal’s weather report.
Third, someone might be barred from transmitting knowledge to
another by the factiveness of knowledge. For instance, Val knows that:
Sal’s fly is open and Sal does not know that his fly is open. Since it is
impossible for Sal to know that Sal’s fly is open and Sal does not know
that his fly is open, Val and Sal can meet Evans’ conditions while Sal
fails to acquire Val’s knowledge.24
It may be that the cases just presented are merely putative counterexamples to the sufficiency of Evans’ conditions. In particular, it may
be that all the cases involve one or another type of defeating condition.
And, related to that possibility, it may be that those cases that survive confrontation with Evans’ ‘no defeating conditions’ condition can
be addressed through various additions to, or modulations of, Evans’
conditions. However, there is no immediate cause for optimism on either count. That is so especially if one requires that the ‘no defeating
conditions’ condition, and any amendments to Evans’ other conditions,
not beg the question in favour of knowledge transmission in the way
that they, and their interconnections, are specified. And absent such a
requirement, the safest course is surely to focus attention on the function of elements meeting Evans’ conditions in cases where knowledge
is transmitted. With respect to those cases the question will be, does
knowledge transmission depend upon the audience’s cognition of the
speakers’ utterance being a piece of propositional knowledge concerning what the speaker said?
However, we are not yet out of the woods. For there may be cases
in which an audience comes to know what a speaker knows, on the basis of cognition targeted on the speaker’s utterance, but where ambient
circumstances conspire to shoulder an abnormal epistemological load.
Just as there may be epistemic cul-de-sacs of the sort we have just considered, it may be that there are counter-cul-de-sacs—what might be
called epistemic thoroughfares.25 For one sort of case, a speaker who
knows that they can speak English might enable an audience to know
that the speaker can speak English by uttering the English sentence ‘I
can speak English’. Assuming that the audience can recognize that the
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production of those words indicates the speaker’s possession of facility
with English, the audience might come to know on that basis that the
speaker can speak English, without depending on understanding and
acceptance of what the speaker has said. Another sort of case is one
involving features that might otherwise make for epistemic cul-de-sacs
that also involves epistemically operative compensating factors. For
instance, Sal’s fragile competence with the English sentence ‘It’s raining’, which was responsible for the second type of cul-de-sac considered
above, might be compensated by Val’s preparedness to correct Sal if his
weather reports should go awry. In that case, it might be argued that
one can come to know from Sal that it is raining even in cases where he
might easily have misreported, due to Val’s disposition to intervene.26
The difficulty this makes for Evans’ argument sketch is that, absent further controls, pieces of audience cognition of what a speaker
has said that do not meet operative standards on knowledge may yet
be subject to compensation in such a way that the epistemic channel
as a whole enables the audience to acquire knowledge from what the
speaker has said. For instance, Val utters the sentence ‘It’s snowing’ in
order to say that it’s snowing. Sal takes it that what Val has said is that
either it’s morning and it’s snowing or it’s afternoon and it’s raining. If
we suppose that Val spoke so close to noon that there was significant
danger of Sal taking it, from what he took Val to have said together
with the time, that it’s raining, then we might take it that, in those
circumstances, Sal can’t acquire from Val knowledge that it is snowing. However, Mal is also present. Mal knows about Sal’s propensity
to make this type of mistake about utterances of ‘It’s raining’, and is
prepared to correct him in those cases—the afternoon cases—where it
is liable to lead Sal astray. If Sal can acquire knowledge from Val in
those circumstances, then it would appear to be possible for an audience to acquire knowledge that a speaker possesses, on the basis of the
speaker’s utterance, but where the prevailing conditions allow this to
take place despite the audience’s ignorance of what the speaker said.
The type of case we should focus on, then, in assessing Evans’
argument sketch, is one with the following properties. Such cases
involve knowledge transmission, from a speaker to an audience, via
the speaker’s giving verbal expression to their knowledge and the audience’s exploiting that verbal expression in order to partake in the
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speaker’s knowledge. Moreover, they are cases in which the epistemic status of the output of transmission—the audience’s acquisition
of knowledge—is positively dependent only upon the status of the individual components of the testimonial chain that Evans’ mentions and
their proper integration, and not (or only negatively) upon extrinsic
factors of a sort that might make for converse-cul-de-sacs.27 Evans’
claim can then be taken to be that, in cases of that sort, the audience’s
exploitation of the speaker’s verbal expression of their knowledge is
required to go via propositional knowledge of what the speaker has
said.
So construed, Evans’ claim has considerable plausibility. Suppose
that we were to conceive of the function of the cognition that underwrites an audience’s exploitation of the speaker’s utterance as supplying access to an essential lemma in an argumentative justification
for the output of transmission. In that case, it is very plausible that,
were the cognition to have a lesser epistemic status than propositional
knowledge, then it would be bound to leech from the epistemic status of the output, to drag the output down to (at best) its own epistemic level. For reflection on cases—prominently, Gettier-style cases—
suggests that argumentatively justified knowledge is subject, not only
to a no false lemmas condition, but also to a no unknown lemmas condition. For related reasons, a number of theorists have found plausible
that a fact or true proposition can serve as a reason for one, or can
serve for one as evidence, just in case it is the object of propositional
knowledge.28 It is therefore plausible that if an audience’s understanding of an utterance provides them with access to a lemma, a factual
reason, or evidence that then plays an essential role in their acquisition of knowledge from a speaker, then their understanding will take
the form of propositional knowledge.
5. TESTIMONY AND MODELS OF UNDERSTANDING

Suppose that that conditional is true. The assessment of Evans’ argument sketch then turns on the question whether the function of utterance understanding, in sustaining the epistemic transactions at issue,
is that of supplying access to a lemma in an argumentative justification. Grounds for considering a negative answer to the latter question
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might be found from a number of sources. For present purposes, we
will restrict attention to those arising from our competitor models of
utterance understanding, (OK) and (RK).
One way of viewing the force of Evans’ argument sketch in supporting adoption of (PK) is the following. In order for knowledge to be
transmitted, via the channel exploited in the target range of cases, the
speaker must give expression to some of their knowledge. In particular, in order to transmit their knowledge that such-and-such, they must
say that such-and-such. Moreover, and crucially, the audience’s occupancy of particular cognitive or epistemic states must determine that
the speaker has done this, that they have said that such-and-such. For
otherwise, it will be consistent with the audience’s cognitive and epistemic state that the speaker did not say that such-and-such, and that
would appear to undermine the possibility that the audience’s occupancy of that state could underwrite the preservation, between speaker
and audience, of cognitive or epistemic standing that determined other
facts, the knowledge that the speaker sought to transmit. Now, since
propositional knowledge is factive, an audience that knows that the
speaker has said that such-and-such is in a cognitive or epistemic state
that determines that the speaker has said that such-and-such. Hence,
if understanding is a form of propositional knowledge, the audience’s
understanding can determine the required facts concerning what the
speaker has said, and so play its role in facilitating the transmission
of other factive cognitive or epistemic standings. However, if other
cognitive or epistemic states are able similarly to determine the facts
about what a speaker has said, then Evans’ argument sketch will support equally models that identify understanding with those other cognitive or epistemic states.
How, if at all, could models other than (PK) identify understanding
with fact-determining cognitive or epistemic states? Consider, first, a
sketch model of some cases of knowledge of logical consequence. A
basic requirement on any such model is that knowledge of the obtaining of a relation of consequence should determine that the relation of
consequence obtains. The view that all cases of cognition of logical
consequence involve propositional knowledge that a particular consequence relation obtains is able to meet that requirement.29 However,
another model that also appears able to meet the requirement is the
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following. Knowledge of cases of consequence can involve a secondorder capacity to gain new knowledge from old, so that, for example, if
one were to come to know that the premises are true, one would then
be in a position to know that the conclusion is true, and if one were to
come to know that the conclusion is false, one would then be in a position to know that some of the premises are false. Since the projected
second-order capacity is a capacity potentially to acquire propositional
knowledge, and since such knowledge is factive, the capacity can only
be possessed if the facts pattern in accord with the capacity. Minimally,
then, possession of the capacity determines that the distributions of
truth-values amongst premises and conclusion will pattern in accord
with the potential outputs of the capacity. Given modest additional assumptions concerning requirements on possession of such a capacity,
and its modal profile—for instance, that possession of the capacity is
independent of, and so cannot be undermined, by any particular way
for premises or conclusion to attain truth-values—it is at least plausible
that possession of the capacity determines more, namely that a relation of consequence obtains between premises and conclusion. If that
is right, then a model of cognition of logical consequence as a secondorder capacity is on a par with a model of such cognition as a form of
propositional knowledge in its ability to underwrite determination, by
cognition or epistemic standing, of the facts about consequence.
Rumfitt’s version of (RK) takes a similar approach to the determination of facts about what is said. Recall that, like the model of cognition
of consequence that we have just considered, (RK) views understanding as a second-order capacity to gain new knowledge from old. In
part, where the utterance was used to say p, the capacity is to know
p in the event of coming to know that the utterance is true. Insofar
as Evans’ argument sketch carries conviction, it provides grounds for
holding that possession of the required capacity requires, and so determines, that the utterance was used to say p. Hence, there is some
reason to think that Evans’ sketch does not, as it stands, favour (PK)
over (RK).
Consider, second, a sketch model of the role of broadly objectual
perception in the acquisition of propositional knowledge. In appropriate circumstances, seeing an object, and perhaps its particular features,
can put suitably equipped subjects in a position to know that the object
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is thus-and-so. For instance, subjects who possess the concept chair,
together with an ability to use that concept in response to what they
see in a way that meets appropriate epistemic standards, can be put
in a position to know that a particular demonstrable object is a chair
by seeing it in appropriate circumstances. Like the class of cases in
which knowledge is acquired partly on the basis of what a knowledgeable speaker has said, the class of cases in which knowledge is acquired
partly on the basis of what one sees is unlikely to form a well-behaved
object of epistemological inquiry. In particular, more or less work in
sustaining one’s capacity to acquire knowledge on the basis of what
one sees is liable to be done by features of the surrounding circumstances, features that may or may not then be objects of perception.
However, as in the case of knowledge acquired from what a speaker
says, it is plausible that there is a range of more or less central cases
in which knowledge is acquired on the basis of what one sees and
where seeing is only able to play its role in facilitating the acquisition
of knowledge because it is itself subject to appropriate epistemic standards. In particular, it is plausible that there are cases where one is
only able to acquire knowledge on the basis of what one sees because
one’s seeing, as it occurs in those cases, determines the fact—or perhaps the present existence or occurrence of some components of the
fact—that one comes thereby to know. If that is right, then we have a
second model on which a psychological state or occurrence that is not
a state of propositional knowledge is yet able to do (some or all of) the
same work as knowledge in determining, for the subject, the layout of
the subject’s environment.
(OK) takes a similar approach to the determination of facts about
what is said. It views understanding an utterance as an attitude directed immediately onto the content expressed by the utterance. For
instance, where the utterance was used to say p, (OK) views understanding that utterance as a matter of bearing its proprietary attitude
to p. Moreover, (OK) has it that the attitude to which it appeals is
subject to broadly epistemic conditions. Merely entertaining a content
that happens to have been expressed by an utterance would not suffice for understanding the utterance. And neither would it suffice to
have been caused so to entertain the content through experience of the
utterance. Rather, the entertaining of content must be both triggered
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by, and suitably responsive to, the content’s expression by the utterance. To a first approximation—an approximation that we will have
reason in the remainder to return to—(OK) takes it that the attitude
to which it appeals is subject to the following condition: if someone
is suitably equipped—if they have the required concepts and applicational abilities—and are in otherwise appropriate circumstances, then
their coming to bear the attitude to the content p would put them in a
position to know that a speaker has said p. Then, since the factiveness
of propositional knowledge transmits to the state of being in a position
to know, it also transmits to the attitude to which (OK) appeals. One
cannot bear the attitude to the content p except in response to someone having given expression to p. Hence, there is some reason to think
that Evans’ sketch does not, as it stands, favour (PK) over (OK).
The epistemological proximity of the three candidate models might
lead one to think that, if any of the models applies to a subject, then
all three models are liable to apply. For example, Rumfitt’s version of
(RK) appears to allow space, not only for the spread of knowledge, but
also for the spread of suppositional commitment.30 In that case, possession of the second-order capacity that it identifies with understanding would put one in a position to determine patterns of commitment
transmission across its left- and right-hand sides. And reflection on
the constraints imposed upon that pattern by one’s understanding—
for instance, where u was used to say p, that supposing that u is true
commits one to also supposing p, and that supposing p false commits
one to also supposing that u is false—might put one in a position to attain propositional knowledge that the target utterance was used to say
p. Hence, those who meet the conditions imposed by (RK) might also
be in a position to meet the requirements of (PK). Alternatively, propositional knowledge that an utterance was used to say p would typically
put its possessor in a position to attain propositional knowledge of a biconditional—where ‘p’ is a denominalized form of ‘p’, knowledge that
u is true iff p—and thence to attain a capacity to spread knowledge
(or suppositional commitment) across the bi-conditional. Hence, typical subjects of (PK) might also be in a position to become subject to
the conditions of (RK). However, even if that were correct, and even if
something similar held with respect to (OK), it would not follow that
satisfaction of conditions in one of the models guarantees satisfaction
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of conditions in the other models. And even if that were somehow
guaranteed, the question would remain as to the relative priority of
the three models, whether one of the models captures the most basic
form of take on what is said, a take that serves to underwrite conditions
on the applicability of the other models. For example, it is consistent
with the claim that all normal subjects of visual experience thereby
acquire propositional knowledge about their surroundings that their
visual experience serves to explain their knowledge, rather than being constituted by that knowledge. Similarly, it is consistent with the
claim that all normal subjects of understanding thereby acquire propositional knowledge, or an epistemic capacity like that detailed in (RK),
that their understanding serves to explain their knowledge or capacity,
rather than being constituted by it.31
From the present, lofty vantage point, the three models appear
able—indeed, equally able—to cope with the needs of testimonial knowledge transmission. However, on closer examination, the complexion of
the issue changes and a variety of specific strengths and weaknesses
emerge. I shall begin with (RK) before turning to (PK) and then (OK).
6. TESTIMONY AND (RK)

The second-order capacity that Rumfitt’s version of (RK) identifies with
understanding is surely an important accompaniment of many cases of
understanding able to sub-serve the transmission of knowledge from
speaker to audience. It is of critical importance, in many such transactions, that coming to know that an utterance is true, or was used to
express something that is true, can make one know, or can put one in
a position to know, the expressed truth. The central question, to reiterate, concerns the extent to which that capacity is more fundamental than other forms of cognition associated with understanding. For
present purposes, we can pursue the question in the following form:
could the second-order capacity be the unique—or even the first—
point of a rational subject’s normal engagement with expressed content? I shall provide reason for thinking that it could not.
The central difference between (RK) and the other two models—
(PK) and (OK)—is that (RK) makes no immediate demands on firstorder stative cognition. To a good first approximation, the crucial dif-
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ference between first- and second-order stative cognition is that only
the former has an immediate bearing on occurrent awareness, including the capacity to entertain, and to make judgments about, expressed
content. In order for second-order stative cognition to determine such
occurrent awareness, it must first issue in first-order stative cognition.
According to (RK), then, a subject can understand someone’s saying
p in the absence of awareness of the saying or its content—in the absence, that is, of a capacity immediately to entertain, or to judge competently about, its content. First-order cognition only emerges, if it
emerges at all, where the subject acquires knowledge of, or takes a cognitive stand concerning, either the truth of the utterance or the content
the utterance was in fact used to express. In those conditions, and only
in those conditions, the subject’s first-order cognition—their knowledge, or cognitive stand—imposes upon them further knowledge, or
commitments, regarding, respectively, the content that the utterance
was used to express or the truth of the utterance. I shall argue that
that feature means, not only that (RK) is false to the phenomenology of
understanding, but also that it is incompatible with central features of
the normal epistemological situation of those who might benefit from
testimony.
Consider the normal situation of a subject who seeks to acquire
knowledge from what they have been told. As Evans makes plain in his
attempt to articulate the elements that sustain knowledge acquisition
in such cases, the subject is typically required—if they are to acquire
the knowledge offered to them by the speaker, rather than for example
a view about the speaker—to accept as true either what the speaker
says or their utterance. There are then two cases to consider: the normal case, wherein the subject has, at most, some indecisive grounds
for trusting the speaker independently of the grounds that the speaker
makes available through giving expression to knowledge in their possession; and an abnormal case, wherein the subject has independent
and yet decisive grounds for taking it that, whatever the speaker said,
they spoke truly. How should we, and indeed the subject, conceive
of the subject’s acceptance of what has been said in the two sorts of
cases? In the abnormal case, since the subject has decisive, independent grounds for accepting whatever the speaker says to them, it is
plausible that any awareness that the subject has of what the speaker
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has said to them in advance of their accepting it as true is irrelevant to
the transaction. In that case, acceptance and cognition of content can
plausibly be merged into acquisition of knowledge that the speaker’s
utterance is true and, thence, via (RK), knowledge of the proposition
expressed by use of the utterance. However, in the normal case, the
subject is forced to accept as true the speaker’s utterance in advance of
enjoying any awareness of the content the utterance was used to express, and with at best indecisive grounds for thinking that—whatever
that content is—it is true. That is surely false to the ordinary phenomenology of communicative transaction: we are ordinarily aware of
what we are invited to accept in advance of accepting it. That is, we
are ordinarily in a position competently to entertain, or to make judgments about, the content we are invited to accept. And it is surely not
an adequate account of rational acceptance of what one is told.32 The
point is not—or not only—that awareness of what a speaker says can
put one into contact with reasons for accepting what they have said.
Rather, the point is that awareness of what a speaker says furnishes
access to what one will immediately become committed to if one accepts what they say. And it is surely a minimal requirement on rational
acceptance of presented information that—failing possession of independent grounds for acceptance—it involves prior cognizance of what
one is thereby accepting.
A perceptual analogy will perhaps help to illustrate the situation.
In the normal case, perceptual experience is, or sustains, awareness of
one’s surroundings. On the basis of how things appear to one, one
forms various beliefs and one comes to accept various propositions
about how things are or how they appear. Now suppose that one was
the unhappy subject of a form of blind-sight with the following characteristics. One is aware that one is undergoing a series of episodes in
which one’s visual machinery operates in response to retinal stimulation. Each such response offers itself to one as an opportunity either
to accept or to reject its deliverance: on accepting what is delivered
by an episode, one acquires cognition that such-and-such is the case;
on rejecting, one acquires cognition that such-and-such is not the case.
That is all; one has no awareness of the content one will cognize on
taking a stand in response to particular episodes. Again, there are two
cases to consider: first, a case wherein one has independent and de-
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cisive grounds for trusting a particular range of such episodes; and,
second, a case wherein one lacks such grounds. While we might allow
that rational acceptance is possible in the first sort of case, it is surely
out of the question that it is possible in the second sort of case. Again,
the point is not—or not only—that awareness of what one experiences
can put one into contact with grounds for accepting that things are
as they appear. Rather, the point is that—except in the abnormal circumstance in which one has grounds for claiming infallibility—rational
acceptance of presented information, here as elsewhere, depends upon
prior awareness of what one is invited to accept.
An attempt might be made to salvage (RK) by appeal to what is arguably a common feature of communicative transactions, the putative
fact that the audience’s stance is rarely neutral with respect to what
they have been told. According to Dummett, when someone tells me
something,
I go through no process of reasoning, however swift, to
arrive at the conclusion that he has spoken aright: my understanding of his utterance and my acceptance of his assertion are one. (Dummett (1993bb): 419).
If Dummett’s description was adequate, not only to the psychology,
but also to the epistemology, of communication, then the pattern it
indicates might provide (RK) with partial immunity from the present
charge. For the concurrence of (RK)-understanding and acceptance
would deliver first-order cognition of expressed content: a belief or acceptance with that content. And the commonality of such concurrence
would then help assuage the concern that (RK) is false to ordinary
phenomenology. However, without supplementation, it does nothing
to abrogate (RK)’s recently explained epistemological failings.
For it to bear on the epistemology of communication, Dummett’s
description would have to go beyond pointing to the typical automaticity of acceptance. In addition, it would have to underwrite the rationality of automatic acceptance. And that requirement means that,
whatever the independent standing of Dummett’s description, it sits
uncomfortably with (RK).
The central problem with (RK) is that it makes one’s first-order
cognition of what was said in an utterance depend upon one’s taking a
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particular stand concerning the subject matter of what was said, either
accepting or rejecting that the subject matter is as it is said to be in the
utterance. One way of seeing the oddity of this consequence of (RK) is
by considering a case where one already knows that which one is being
told. Suppose, for instance, that one knew p, and that this knowledge
was operative in a given situation so that, ceteris paribus, one would
reject as illusory perceptual appearances as of p’s not being the case.
Still, according to (RK), in order to cognize what was said by someone who said p not to be the case, one would either have to accept or
reject the truth of their utterance. But notice that the cognitive effect
of rejection would be nugatory: one already knew p. Indeed, according to (RK), because one knew p, one thereby knew that the utterance
was false, so rejection was forced. But if we assume that one knew at
least one proposition in addition to p, then knowing that the utterance
was false would not put one in a position to know which piece of one’s
knowledge dictated its falsehood. So, one would be no better placed
to cognize the content expressed in the utterance. Alternatively, the
effect of acceptance would be that, despite one’s knowing p, one nevertheless accepted, for however short a time, not-p. The consequence
that one cannot get into a position to reject claims that are inconsistent with what one knows or believes without first running a dogleg
through acceptance of those claims is no happier here than would be
an analogous requirement in perceptual epistemology.33
In effect, (RK) has a tendency to force one to distinguish between
the a-rational type of acceptance that it claims is involved in coming to
enjoy first-order cognition of what is said and the rational species involved in taking a stand on what one thereby comes to cognize. Rather
than understanding, as cognition of what is said, providing invitations to commitment which one may rationally—albeit automatically—
accept or reject, on (RK) one’s understanding combines with a-rational
acceptance in order to provide commitments which one may rationally
retain or discard. When combined with the typical automaticity of
acceptance, the upshot is a model on which the most immediate deliverance of a subject’s understanding is their taking a stand on the
subject matter of what is said. And that is surely not how understanding functions to provide us with information about the world. As John
McDowell puts the point,
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Now if a standing in the space of reasons with respect to
a fact is acquired in hearing and understanding a remark,
the standing is surely a mediated one. It is not as if the
fact itself directly forces itself on the hearer; his rational
standing with respect to it surely depends on (at least) his
hearing and understanding what his informant says, and
this dependence is rational, not merely causal. (McDowell
(1994): 417)
McDowell’s point is that, although the epistemic standing one can acquire through hearing and understanding a remark can encompass a
remarked fact, as it will do in many cases in which one automatically
accepts what one is told, one’s acceptance is nonetheless a rational
response to what one immediately takes in through hearing and understanding. And that requires that one can take something in through
hearing and understanding whilst remaining neutral about its alethic
status.34 If that is right, then Dummett’s observation concerning the
automaticity of acceptance offers no refuge to (RK). What is wanted
is precisely what (RK) refuses to offer, a form of first-order cognition
that can serve as neutral input to rational acceptance or rejection. I
conclude that the claim that (RK) models our most fundamental engagement with what is said should not be accepted.
7. TESTIMONY AND (PK)

The next model on the agenda is (PK), according to which understanding an utterance is a matter of knowing what was said in that utterance.
Returning to Evans’ description, we have that understanding a remark
provides the immediate basis for accepting or rejecting what was said
in the remark. And the argument that we developed on the basis of
Evans’ sketch made plausible that the basis for acceptance must itself
meet epistemic conditions if acceptance on that basis is to sub-serve
the transmission of knowledge. Obviously enough, (PK) sustains the
requirement that the basis for acceptance meets epistemic conditions.
However, if knowledge of what has been said is to play its allotted role
in underwriting the transmission of knowledge via acceptance, it has
to provide an appropriate cognitive interface between a speaker’s saying what they do and the audience accepting what the speaker says
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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and so acquiring knowledge from them. The two questions on which
assessment of (PK) turns concern its capacity to provide such an interface: first, an analogue of our question for (RK), could knowledge
of what has been said be the unique—or even the first—point of a rational subject’s normal engagement with expressed content?; second,
could knowledge of what has been said serve as the immediate basis
for acceptance, or rejection, of what has been said?
There is some temptation to give the first question a fast, negative
answer. For the claim that the first point at which contingent information about the external world might impact on a subject is their
coming to know that information is extremely implausible, suggesting
as it does that there is no way in which they know it. There may be
cases in which we have propositional knowledge without there being
any way in which we have that knowledge: perhaps some knowledge
about one’s own mind or action and some a priori knowledge is like
that. But such cases are surely special, not least in that they appear not
to concern contingent information about that which is independent of
their possessor. So, if the claim that propositional knowledge of what
has been said might be the sole point of engagement with the expression of content amounts to the claim that there is no prior source, or
specifiable channel, through which that engagement emerged, then it
is liable to be given short shrift.
However, that line is too quick. Very often, we attain propositional
knowledge of some fact without prior awareness of that fact, as when
we exploit a combination of perception and expertise in order to acquire propositional knowledge as to the kind of thing with which we
are presented. For instance, one’s visual experience of a flash of colour
on a bird’s plumage might combine with one’s expertise in the categorisation of birds in order to allow one to know that it is a red-throated
loon. Similarly, then, a defence of (PK) can be mounted by appeal to
the claim that knowledge of what is said is the upshot of a combination of perception—say, perception of an utterance or its production, as
on (UK)—and expertise, an expert capacity to come to know what was
said by the use of utterances of specific types, in specific circumstances.
There is no need, on such a view, to deny that there is a way in which
one comes to have such propositional knowledge, or to require that
the only route is one that goes via prior cognitive engagement with the
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expression of content. It would obviously take extended discussion in
order properly to assess the prospects of such an account of knowledge
of what is said; but they do not appear especially bleak.
By contrast with the first question, the second is liable to invite a
quick, affirmative answer. For it is apt to appear obvious that knowing
what a speaker has said puts one in the best possible position to accept
or reject what they have said. Again, however, it seems to me that the
quick answer is too quick. The basic difficulty facing (PK) here is that
the direct object of propositional knowledge of what is said is different
from the direct object of acceptance. To a good first approximation,
knowing what a speaker has said is an unspecified form of knowing
with an object picked out by a complementizer phrase. It is a matter
of knowing that such-and-such, where such-and-such is a correct and
appropriate answer to the question, what did the speaker say? For instance, where Flo said that smoking is addictive, one’s knowing what
Flo said is one’s knowing that Flo said that smoking is addictive (and
not one’s knowing that smoking is addictive). By contrast, accepting
what a speaker has said is an unspecified form of knowing with an object picked out by a nominal phrase. It is a matter of accepting that
such-and-such, where such-and-such is identical with (NP) what—that
which—the speaker said. For instance, where Flo said that smoking is
addictive, one’s accepting what Flo said is one’s accepting that smoking is addictive (and not one’s accepting that Flo said that smoking
is addictive). It is therefore a pressing question for the proponent of
(PK) how ordinary speakers make the transition from what they take in
through understanding—propositional knowledge of what is said—to
cognition of what they are invited on that basis to accept.
There are really two challenges here: the proponent of (PK) must
provide means by which the required transition can be effected and
also explain how the epistemic standing of understanding is transmitted so that acceptance can be a means of securing knowledge. The
most natural way of attempting to deliver the required result is by viewing the transition as a matter of knowledge- (or epistemic standing-)
preserving inference. Then the articulation of the required inference
would have to go via principles able to mediate between the proposition known through understanding—an instance of the propositionschema that S has said p—and the proposition accepted on that basis—
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an instance of p. And the most natural principles able to mediate that
transition are what I shall call saying-equivalence and propositionalequivalence (where ‘p’ is instanced by canonical nominal specifications
of propositions and ‘p’ by the denominalized sentential analogues of
those specifications):
(Saying-equivalence)

S said p if and only if what S said = p

(Propositional-equivalence)

p is true if and only if p

On the basis of these principles, the following transition can be effected:
(P1)
(P2)
(P3)
(P4)
(P5)

A knows that S said p [Via understanding, according to (PK)]
A knows that what S said = p [From P1, saying-equivalence]
A accepts that what S said is true [Initial application of acceptance]
A accepts that p is true [P2, P3, substitution of identicals]
A accepts that p [P4, propositional-equivalence]35

If that is the way that the proponent of (PK) seeks to ensure the
transition from understanding to an appropriate target for acceptance,
then they are required to view the two principles, saying-equivalence
and propositional-equivalence, as cognized by A with appropriate epistemic standing—that is, they must be objects of A’s knowledge or be
determined by A’s second-order capacity to preserve knowledge across
their bi-conditionals—and as exploited by A in the course of coming to
accept (some of) what they take in through understanding. The point
isn’t, of course, that A must consciously run through the steps of the
proposed transition; rather, it is that interventions on the epistemic
standing for A of steps in the transition must potentially have impact
upon the epistemic standing for A of accepting the output.
There are two potential sources of concern with the proposed account, the first of which may be only apparent. The first source of
concern is due to the immediate target of acceptance on the present
account: as with (RK), there is a risk that the present account requires
that A accepts that what a speaker has said is true (at P3) in advance of
appropriately cognizing the proposition to which they are thereby com-
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mitted (at P5), that which the speaker has said. Although that result
would be troubling, I think that a response is available. The proponent
of (PK) can appeal to a plausible principle to the effect that cognition that a speaker has said p requires cognition of p, on the grounds
that canonical thinking about a particular way of thinking—e.g., p—
requires that one’s cognition instances that way of thinking.36 In that
case, A’s knowledge that S said p would require A to cognize p and
therefore, to that extent, to enjoy prior awareness of what they were
accepting in accepting that what was said is true. The remainder of the
derivation would then be required, not to furnish awareness of what
is expressed by p, but rather to ensure that that awareness is appropriately linked with A’s knowledge that S said p so that it can share in
the epistemic credentials of that cognition. It may be useful here to
compare the situation of Sal, who knows that Val knows p. If Sal also
knows that knowledge is factive, then he can exploit that knowledge
to come to know p. Alternatively, since knowing that someone knows
p requires cognizing p, Sal might simply accept what he thereby cognizes. Only in the former case would the output amount to knowledge
of p; in the latter, Sal’s acceptance of p would not be dependent in the
right way on the available grounds and so would not amount to knowledge. The case is similar with respect to what is said. Absent the later
steps in the proposed derivation, acceptance of p would not amount to
epistemologically appropriate acceptance of what was said.
The second source of concern targets the role of the principles in
the account. The concern is, not that the required principles are false,
but rather that it is implausible to suppose that an audience’s capacity to exploit their understanding in order to acquire knowledge depends upon their acknowledging those principles. It seems to me plausible that one might understand an utterance and on that basis acquire
knowledge from its producer without exploiting the principles whether
or not one knew them, while failing to know the principles, while failing to believe the principles, and even while lacking the conceptual
abilities required to cognize the principles. I shall focus here on the apparent possibility of acquiring knowledge from testimony while failing
to know, or believe, the principles.
The first point to note is that, unless conforming to (PK)—knowing
what a speaker has said—suffices for knowledge of the required prin-
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ciples, conforming to (PK) fails to suffice for appropriate acceptance of
what is said. In that case, it would be possible, according to (PK), to
understand an utterance without being in a position knowledgably to
accept what was said in that utterance. That result would clearly count
against (PK), so I shall begin with it.
It is surely plausible that many, if not most, people who are capable
of knowing what someone has said are capable of deriving from that
knowledge an identification of what was said, via knowledge of something like saying-equivalence, and then deriving from that, via something like propositional-equivalence, knowledge of what would be the
case if what was said was true. But the question at issue is whether
knowing what someone has said suffices for those capacities. And it
seems to me that the answer is that it does not.
Comparison with Sal is again apposite. Although Sal knows that
Val knows p, and although Sal would once have been inclined to infer
to p on that basis, his inclination has been tempered by philosophical
reflection. In particular, Sal holds the following: (i) that knowledge
is factive only if all those who possess the concept of knowledge treat
it as factive; (ii) that some people who appear to possess the concept
of knowledge admit cases, with some notable feature, NF, where the
transition from ‘S knows p’ to ‘p’ fails to preserve truth; (iii) that no
decisive argument is available that shows that the people who reject
factiveness in some cases do not possess the concept of knowledge;
(iv) the present case, Val’s knowing p, appears to possess the notable
feature, NF. Because of this, Sal is unable to exploit the factiveness of
knowledge in order to arrive at knowledge of p even if he is willing to
set aside what he takes to be his reasonable reluctance.
Now we can assume that Sal is willing in the vast majority of cases—
cases where NF is absent—to reason in accordance with the factiveness
of knowledge, and that his views about knowledge are otherwise impeccable. So there seem to be no adequate grounds on which to deny
that Sal is sufficiently competent with the concept of knowledge to
know that Val knows p. His reluctance to reason in accord with the factiveness of knowledge is due, not to incomprehension, but rather to his
endorsement of the putative reasons against the factiveness of knowledge with which he has been presented.37 Moreover, the case does not
require that Sal’s ability to think with the concept of knowledge is fully
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autonomous. It is consistent with the case that Sal’s ability is dependent on his being suitably connected with more expert thinkers. If we
add that Sal would be prepared to defer to the experts—who, we may
suppose, endorse factiveness—then it is hard to see what even apparent grounds remain for denying that he knows that Val knows p. It
follows that knowing that someone knows p does not suffice for knowing, or for being in a position to know, p.
Similar cases can be constructed with respect to the two target principles. I shall focus here upon propositional-equivalence. Consider,
for example, Val, who knows that Sal said p. Although Sal believes
that propositional-equivalence is generally correct (she may think that
it is correct when construed generically), she believes that it does not
hold universally. She reasons as follows. (i) She believes that the only
ground for endorsing the universal applicability of either direction of
the equivalence is the universal applicability of the bi-conditional. (ii)
She believes that the universal applicability of the bi-conditional is undermined by cases with a notable feature, NF, in which she accepts p
but is unwilling to accept that p is true (one type of case involves propositions with a putatively normative subject matter, like the proposition
that one should not smoke). (iii) Because she believes that the only
ground for endorsing the universality of either direction of the equivalence is thereby undermined, she believes that the right to left direction
is only applicable in cases lacking NF. (iv) She thinks that what Sal said
exhibits NF, or at least she takes herself to lack adequate grounds for
thinking that it lacks NF. On that basis, she refuses to reason in accord
with propositional-equivalence: although she accepts that what Sal said
is true, she refuses, on that basis, to accept p. Moreover, even if she
were to reason in accord with the principle, the outstanding apparent
reasons against so doing that are available to Val mean that the upshot of her reasoning in accord with the principle could not amount to
knowledge.38
Now, as in the case of Sal, we can assume that Val is willing in
the vast majority of cases—cases where she is convinced that NF is
absent—to reason in accordance with propositional-equivalence, and
that her views about truth and propositional content are otherwise impeccable. So there seem to be no adequate grounds on which to deny
that Val is sufficiently competent to know that Sal said p. Her reluc-
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tance to reason in accord with the principle is due, not to incomprehension, but rather to the view she takes about the putative reasons
against its applicability with which he has been presented. Moreover,
the case does not require that Val’s abilities to think with the concepts
of proposition and truth are fully autonomous. It is consistent with the
case that Val’s abilities are dependent on her being suitably connected
with more expert thinkers. If we add that Val would be prepared to defer to the experts—who, we may suppose, fully endorse propositionalequivalence—then it is hard to see what even apparent grounds remain
for denying that she knows that Sal said p. It follows that knowing that
someone has said p does not suffice for acknowledging propositionalequivalence.
The upshot to this point is that knowing that someone has said
p does not suffice for adherence to propositional-equivalence and so
does not suffice to put one in a position, on the basis of the proposed
derivation, to accept (or reject) what they have said. As noted, that result clearly counts against (PK). Not only does it undermine the claim
that (PK) respects the commonplace thought that understanding what
someone says can suffice for putting in a position to accept (or reject)
what they have said. It also raises the spectre of a threat we considered earlier, that conditions additional to those imposed by (PK) might
usurp the role of understanding in underwriting the transmission of
knowledge. But the most basic objection that arises from reflection on
the result is that it is driven solely by theory. For there is no modelindependent plausibility to the claim that the sort of idiosyncrasy that
would undermine knowledge of propositional-equivalence must also undermine one’s capacity to acquire knowledge through accepting what
one has been told.
There are three main points to note here, of which the first is most
important. The first point is that a candidate model that is apparently
able to avoid the result is waiting in the wings: (OK). The model is a
component of Locke’s own response to the needs of knowledge communication:
Men learn Names, and use them in Talk with others, only
that they may be understood: which is then done, when
by Use or Consent, the Sound I make by the Organs of
Speech, excites in another Man’s Mind, who hears it, the
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Idea I apply it to in mind, when I speak it. (Locke (1689):
III.iii.2).
Locke’s model of our understanding of words, a component of what Peter Pagin calls the Classical View of communication, is one on which its
immediate deliverance is engagement with expressed content—the excitement of Ideas to which the words are applied.39 As we saw above,
such an account is able to meet the epistemic demands of knowledge
transmission by virtue of the special mode of engagement with content
to which it appeals. Enjoyment of that mode of engagement is such
that it would put suitably equipped subjects in a position to know that
the content has been expressed. But exploitation of that engagement
for further cognitive purposes is not restricted to going via the propositional knowledge that it can make available. Rather, the engagement
makes content available immediately for acceptance or rejection, and
does so in a way that can apparently determine that its outputs have
an appropriate epistemic status. Acceptance of a content that one engages through (OK)-understanding is linked epistemically with the expression of content in approximately the same way as on (PK). The
major difference between the two models is that (OK) makes content
available in an appropriate form for immediate acceptance or rejection
without the need to run a dogleg through propositional- and sayingequivalence. Such models therefore meet the plausible demand that
understanding be transparent to the content expressed in its target.40
The second point is that an analogous result in other putatively similar cases would be, if anything, even more implausible. Consider, for
example, the case of factual memory. The analogous result here would
amount to the claim that one who lacked specific pieces of general
knowledge concerning the nature of factual memory and its objects
would be debarred thereby from having the same knowledge in the
present that they had possessed in the past.
The third point bolsters the second. It is plausible that both memory
and testimony often function simply to preserve knowledge, the former
intra- and the latter inter-personally.41 But according to the present
proposal, there are circumstances of speaker and audience ignorance
of propositional-equivalence in which testimony would generate new
knowledge. For instance, a speaker who knows p and says p on that
basis might be barred, by ignorance of propositional-equivalence left-towww.thebalticyearbook.org
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right from knowing, on the basis of their knowledge, that p is true. And
yet an audience who was ignorant of propositional-equivalence rightto-left might be able to get to the point of knowing p is true on the
basis of what the speaker said, without being able to move from that
position to knowing p. While we might be willing to allow for the
possibility of such transactions—for instance, as special cases of the
type of epistemic thoroughfare considered above—the present result is
that, absent rather specialist knowledge, they might easily be the norm.
Even taken together, the three points are not decisive. But they impose a severe burden of proof on the defender of (PK) who wishes to
embrace the result, especially if their defence is mounted from a position of commonsense. All else being equal, a model of understanding
on which it is transparent to expressed content is to be favoured.
As an alternative to embracing the result, the defender of (PK)
might instead argue that (PK) can be understood in a way that doesn’t
deliver the result. The result appears to depend upon our viewing
the required transition from propositional knowledge to an appropriate target for acceptance as going via personal level knowledge of the
equivalence principles. However, it might instead be proposed that the
required transition is made automatically in a way that doesn’t depend
upon the subject’s personal level view of the principles.
The problem with the proposed defence of (PK) is that it makes
it hard to see why possession of propositional knowledge of what has
been said is required to ensure the standing of the output of acceptance. Propositional knowledge of what is said appears to be serving
simply to trigger the operations of a system whose function is to deliver the type of engagement with content that (OK) identifies with
understanding. Since the bearing of the knowledge on the deliverance
is a-rational, and since what matters about the deliverance is just its
epistemic standing, however it is derived, the claim that propositional
knowledge plays the required triggering role would need very special
pleading. There is no obvious reason why the output couldn’t be delivered in immediate response to a speaker’s saying what they do, rather
than having to be derived via propositional knowledge.
The outcome up to this point is conditional. If an alternative model
is defensible, on which understanding involves immediate and epistemically appropriate engagement with expressed content, then that
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model is to be favoured over (PK). We should turn, then, to assessment
of (OK).
8. TESTIMONY AND (OK)

An initial objection to (OK) is that it is not clear how it is able to cope
with epistemic sensitivity to the specific forces with which content can
be expressed. The objection allows that (OK) might supply an adequate model of some of our engagements with expressed content. The
concern is, first, that it provides no obvious space for sensitivity to the
manner in which content is expressed—as asserted, questioned, commanded, etc.—and, second, that such sensitivity plays an essential role
in mandating appropriate responses to expressions of content, and so
is required in order to account for the type of response involved in epistemically appropriate acceptance of some of what is said in one’s presence. And the objection is premised on the thought that it is straightforward to accommodate the required sensitivity on (PK), via the differences between e.g. knowing that a speaker asserted p, knowing that
a speaker asked p, and knowing that a speaker ordered p.
One response to the objection would be to question the alignment
it proposes between understanding an expression of content and acknowledging the force with which the content was expressed. It is
surely possible, for example, to grasp the content of what someone has
said and yet to be at a loss as to the force with which it was expressed—
as, for instance, when one is speaking with a person who consistently
uses rising intonation. And it would be natural to allow that in such
circumstances one might count as having understood, at least partially,
what the speaker had said. However, there are two reasons for thinking that the proffered response is inadequate. First, it is clear that
grasp of content without grasp of force would amount to less than perfect understanding of what a speaker has said. And since a model is
available that is able to capture the more perfect case, any model not
able to do so is to that extent disfavoured. Second, and more pressing in the present context, grasp of content without any grasp of force
would be inadequate to underwrite knowledge transmission. If nothing about one’s cognitive or epistemic standing determines whether a
content with which one is presented has been presented for endorse-
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ment, or rather for consideration or compliance, then one is not in a
position to acquire knowledge from it by endorsing it. It could too easily have been the case that one was endorsing the content of a question
or command.
A response on which (OK) is able to capture sensitivity to force is
therefore to be preferred. And such a response is available. What is
required is that sensitivity to force is built into the demands on the
mode of engagement with content to which (OK) appeals. It would
demand an analysis of the multifarious forces with which content can
be expressed in order fully to develop such a response. For present purposes, I shall restrict myself to saying something about how this might
be done for the broadly assertive forces that play a role in knowledge
transmission, and something about a recipe for deriving a more general
account.42
With respect to the broadly assertive forces, responsiveness to which
is critical to the acquisition of knowledge through testimony, the appropriate mode of engagement with content would be one with the
following properties. First, it would be a mode whereby one entertains
content as an appropriate object for acceptance or rejection. To borrow a formulation from Burge, it would be a mode of entertaining the
content as having been presented-as-true. Second, it would be a mode
that is constrained so that, for example, it is only possible to enjoy that
mode of engagement with content if the content has been presented-astrue—that is, expressed with broadly assertive force. More generally, it
would be a mode of engagement that would put suitably equipped subjects in a position to know that the content had been expressed with
broadly assertive force, that it had been asserted. Such an account
would build the demands of appropriate responsiveness to assertion
into the nature of subjects’ attitudes towards content, and so insulate
those demands from the vagaries of speakers’ knowledge that caused
trouble for (PK).
The general recipe would then go via the type of account that would
anyway be required on (PK). One would give an account of the types
of responses that are appropriate to knowledge of the expression of
content via the various forces—for instance, acceptance or rejection,
intending to comply or refuse, etc.—and then build the demands of
that account into the nature of the mode of engagement with expressed
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content that is appropriate to expressions of content with those forces.
And notice that such an account is not an optional extra even on (PK).
For as we have seen with respect to the generic saying, the pattern of
response appropriate to specific forces with which content is expressed
is not dictated just by propositional knowledge that content has been
expressed with a specific force, but depends on additional capacities
that make available the content in the right form for further cognition.
And just as knowledge that someone had said p can be blocked from
appropriate impact on further cognition by idiosyncratic views about
saying, so can knowledge that someone has asserted, or ordered, p.
Much more work would be required to develop the second response
to the point where it would be likely to compel conviction. But the
present sketch serves to remove the immediate threat posed by the
first objection. However, there is a second objection to (OK) which I do
not think can be answered.
In explaining above how (OK) might meet some of the epistemic
demands of knowledge transmission, I offered the following as a first
approximation to the epistemic power of the modes of engagement
with content to which (OK) appeals. (OK) holds that the modes, or
attitudes, to which it appeals are subject to the following condition:
if someone is suitably equipped, and is in otherwise appropriate circumstances, then their coming to bear the attitude to the content p
would put them in a position to know that a speaker has said p. And
I warned that we would have cause to return to the approximation.
One central feature of the approximation is that it makes understanding a matter of knowing that a speaker has given expression to the
entertained content, rather than specifying for the subject a particular source for the expression of content. Then two pressing questions
concern, first, whether (OK) is entitled to that much by way of determination of source and, second, whether that much determination of
source is enough to facilitate the transmission to the subject of knowledge that is in the possession of a specific speaker. And since (PK) is
obviously able to account for the determination of a specific speaker as
source for an expressed content, through knowledge that that speaker
has said such-and-such, positive assessment of (OK) appears to depend
upon the answers to these questions.
With respect to the first question—whether the attitudes or modes
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of engagement with content to which (OK) appeals can determine that
the source of content is a speaker—there are at least two reasons for
thinking that the answer may be negative. The first reason is that a
simple attitude towards content, even expressed content, appears to
be incapable of determining that the form of expression was speech. At
best, such an attitude might determine that the content has a source
other than the subject. The second reason is that, depending upon
how the demands on expression of content are spelled out, such an
attitude may be incapable of determining that entertained content has
a single, rather than multiple, sources. For instance, suppose that Val
uttered the sentence ‘smoking is addictive’ and, simultaneously, Sal uttered the sentence ‘gambling is a vice’. If we allow that, between them,
Val and Sal gave expression to the proposition that gambling is addictive, then the demands thus far imposed on (OK)’s proprietary attitude
towards expressed content allow that one might understand what Val
and Sal thereby said through appropriate entertaining of that proposition, without being in a position to establish whether there was a
source for that content. And even if we do not allow the possibility of
joint expression of content, it is hard to see how (OK) can account for
sensitivity to the difference between individual and joint cases. For similar reasons, a subject who met the conditions imposed by (OK) might
be in a position consistent with any of many candidate speakers having
been the source of the content that they thereby entertain. In order for
a specific source to be determined, from the perspective of the subject,
the identity of the source must figure as an object of the subject’s attitudes. Yet the attitudes constitutive of understanding, according to
(OK), are directed solely onto expressed content. Minimally, then, understanding, according to that model, fails autonomously to determine
a specific source for content entertained through understanding. The
options available to (OK), then, are either to accept that understanding
is consistent with failure of determination of source, or to distribute responsibility for engagement with content and determination of source
amongst different epistemic powers.
Considered in abstraction from present concerns, the first option
has some plausibility. It is surely possible to understand what someone
has said without being in a position to know the specific identity of
the source of what has been said, as might be the case were one to
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overhear a conversation going in the next room. However, even in that
sort of case, one’s cognition, including perception of overheard speech,
would determine the specific sources of what one thereby understood,
whether or not one was in a position to exploit that determination in
order to acquire knowledge of the identities of those sources. And if
understanding is to put one in a position to acquire knowledge from
specific sources, then it appears essential that one’s cognition should
determine one’s specific sources. For if nothing about one’s cognition
determined that one were being invited to accept what one, rather than
another, speaker has said, then it might easily have been the case that
one was accepting testimony from either source. And in that case, one’s
acceptance would be related too tenuously to any particular speaker for
one to acquire knowledge specifically in that speaker’s possession.43
A natural proposal at this point would be that cognition able to
underwrite knowledge transmission involves a sort of joint cognition
of utterance and expressed content, so a combination of (UK) and
(OK).44 But mere joint acquaintance with utterance and expressed content would appear to leave open, from the subject’s perspective, whether
the utterance and the content are related in the right way for cognition
of the utterance to underwrite determination of a particular source for
the entertained content. It would appear to be possible to be jointly acquainted with the content and an utterance even though they are not
related in the right way, for example by happening, for whatever reason, to entertain the proposition that snow is white whilst perceiving
an utterance of ‘grass is green’. Moreover, it would appear to be possible for the acquaintance with content in that circumstance to amount
to understanding an utterance in accord with (OK), albeit not the utterance which one is acquainted with in accord with (UK). Mere joint
acquaintance with content and utterance, then, does not suffice to determine that the content was expressed by that particular utterance. If
that’s right, then it would appear to be possible to entertain the proposition that snow is white whilst perceiving an utterance that was used
to express that content without one’s overall epistemic state guaranteeing the association of content and utterance. There appears to be
no reason, on the view combining (UK) with (OK), why occupancy of
the latter sort of epistemic state, involving an utterance and the content it was used to express, should put the subject in a better epistemic
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position with respect to the association of content and utterance than
would occupancy of the former state, involving an utterance and an
arbitrarily related content. In short, the fact that one might be jointly
acquainted with an utterance and an arbitrary content shows that mere
joint acquaintance with utterance and content does not suffice to determine a specific source for the expression of that content.45
9. A FIFTH MODEL?

The position to this point is as follows. (OK) and (PK), unlike (RK),
offer accounts of understanding able to sustain its neutrality—the fact
that understanding provides its subjects with an invitation to acceptance, rather than imposing on them a commitment. And (OK), unlike
(PK), offers an account of understanding that is of the right transparent
form to underwrite rational acceptance. Finally, (PK), unlike (OK), can
account for the determination, from the understanding subject’s perspective, of particular sources for what is said. If that is right, and the
demands of neutrality, transparency, and source determination are to
be respected, then none of the models with which we began is acceptable. Alternatively, if we take the negative verdict on (PK) to depend
upon the existence of an adequate model that respects transparency,
then we might take the failure of (OK) as evidence that we shall have
to live with the peculiarities of (PK)’s account of acceptance.
The main brief of the present paper has been to provide a prophylactic against premature capitulation in one or another account of
understanding due to a felt lack of alternatives. As a final service to
that brief, I wish to conclude by sketching an alternative to the models
considered here.
The models we have considered were derived from elementary reflection upon the components of facts about people saying things. However, we ignored an apparently central component of such facts: particular episodes or events of people saying things. The occurrence of
such episodes or events, in addition to episodes of utterance, suggests
the availability of a fourth schematic model of understanding:
(EK) A knowsw [/has apprehendedw /is acquaintedw with]
an episode or event in which S (produced u and thereby)
said p.
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Events in which a speaker said p are most fundamentally events in
which a subject—the speaker—comes into relation—a determinate of
the determinable having said-relation—with an object—the proposition
p. It is plausible that apprehension or awareness of such fundamentally
relational events requires acquaintance with or awareness of their subjects and their objects, so in this case acquaintance with or awareness
of the speaker, and perhaps their production of u, and also acquaintance with or awareness of the proposition p. It is also plausible that
apprehension of such events requires appropriate sensitivity to the fundamental type of relation that they involve, in this case a determinate
of the determinable the having said-relation. Finally, apprehension of
the event as a whole, given its nature, determines for the subject how
its elements are organised. If that is right, then such a model may be
able to sustain the demands of neutrality and form, by way of incorporating acquaintance with expressed content. And it may be able to
sustain the demands of source-determination by way of incorporating
acquaintance with the speaker, together with appropriate sensitivity
to the speaker’s relation to the expressed content, all via immediate
apprehension of the event as a whole. I lack the space to pursue assessment of the prospects for such a model, so offer it up as a hostage
to further pursuit of the nature of understanding.
Notes
1
Earlier versions of some of this material were presented at Mark Textor’s discussion
group at King’s College London, a conference on Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge,
Riga, 2009, and a seminar at the University of Birmingham. I’m grateful to audiences
on those occasions for their comments. Thanks especially to Corrine Besson, Simon
Blackburn, Darragh Byrne, Stacie Friend, Mitchell Green, Nils Kurbis, Hemdat Lerman,
Alex Miller, Douglas Patterson, Dean Pettit, Gurpreet Rattan, Stephen Schiffer, Barry C.
Smith, Tom Sorell, Matthew Soteriou, Mark Textor, Asa Wikforss, and David Yates.
2
For discussion of some of them, see Pettit (2002); Longworth (2008a).
3
See Longworth (2008a), 2009. Note that it is left open whether state-understanding
is itself a disposition or ability, e.g. the disposition or ability to have facts about meaning
or what is said serve as reasons for one, as suggested by Hyman (1999), 2006. If it is,
then ability-understanding is a second (or even higher) order disposition or ability: the
disposition or ability to instance dispositions of abilities. It is also left open whether ability-understanding is merely an habitual or generic of state-understanding, rather than
some more substantive form of disposition or ability. Compare here ‘Florence understands (/can understand) what people say’ with ‘Florence catches (/can catch) fish’.
Finally, it is left open whether achievement-understanding is merely coming to have
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state-understanding, or whether it has a distinctive nature over and above change to
that state. Compare here ‘Florence (has) understood what Kim said’ with ‘Florence (has)
landed a fish’.
4
Although I won’t attempt to defend the thought here, I think that it is plausible that
the three forms of understanding of sentence meanings are to be understood through
their roles in sustaining the three forms of understanding of what is said. For present
purposes, my only commitment is to the interest in pursuit of an account of understanding of what is said, whatever its precise connexions with understanding of meaning.
5
Cp. Wittgenstein: ‘The grammar of the word “knows” is evidently closely related to
that of “can”, “is able to”. But also closely related to that of “understands”. (‘Mastery’ of
a technique.)’ (1953: §150).
6
The claim is not that knowing is a disposition to judge, but only that it is possible for
knowing immediately to determine that the knower has such a disposition. The claim is
therefore consistent with the possibility that knowing can be prevented from determining
judgement, for example by inhibition or other forms of countermanding cognition. And
it is consistent with the possibility that there are additional general conditions on the
determination of a disposition to judge, for instance that the knower must possess a
generic capacity for judgement and a suitable repertoire of conceptual abilities.
7
For related discussion, see Davies (1986); Evans (1981); Miller (1997); Stich (1978).
8
Since some occurrences of schematic ‘p’ are within the context of putatively non-extensional verbs, e.g. ‘said’, while some occur without those contexts, it should not be
assumed that it has the same types of instances in all its occurrences.
9
Compare Dummett on occurrent thought: ‘Suppose that I am walking along the
street with my wife, and suddenly stop dead and say (in English), “I have left the address
behind”. What constitutes my having at that moment had the thought that I expressed
need be no more than just the fact that I know English and said those words; there does
not have to have been anything else that went on within me simultaneously with my
utterance of the sentence.’ (1993ba: 99)
10
It would be a large project to determine precise membership of the tradition, but
it would be natural to consider seriously for inclusion Baker & Hacker (2005); Rundle
(2001); Ryle (1949) (especially pp.50-59); Wittgenstein (1953); Horwich (1998), 2005.
11
In our terms, understanding a language would be a form of ability-understanding.
For doubts about the attribution to Wittgenstein, see McDowell (2009).
12
Depending upon how it is spelled out, Frege’s proposal might conflict with some
views on which the processes responsible for the entertaining of expressed content are
modular. The issue turns largely on the scope of the will in Frege’s account: whether
he holds that one can entertain the content expressed by a word at will, or whether one
can, at most, will the allocation of modular processing resources, for instance through
directing one’s attention.
13
For discussion of related issues in the case of visual perception, see Martin (2002).
14
See also Kaplan (1990).
15
See also Adrian Moore’s proposal that understanding is (in general) ‘knowledge of
how to process knowledge’ (1997: 189). Rumfitt’s model exploits the type of distinction
between dispositional cognition and dispositions to cognition explored in Audi (1994).
16
See also Rumfitt (1995), 2001.
17
The outputs of exercises of the capacity would involve cognition of the expression
of content in those cases where the understood utterance was used to say e.g. that an
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utterance expressed a particular content.
18
As is well known, Locke appears less sanguine about the epistemic power of testimony in other parts of his work. See e.g. 1689: I.iv.23, though note that this more
sceptical passage is located in a discussion of innate ideas.
19
Evans elsewhere appears to opt for a more minimal model, closer to (OK): ‘Full
understanding [of the use of an ordinary proper name] requires one. . . to entertain, as
expressed by the speaker, a proposition of the form a is F, where a is an adequate Idea
of the referent’ (1982: 403). Another divergence from (PK) is that Evans focuses on
truth-conditions, rather than what is said.
20
It may be that Evans feels compelled to adopt the bipartite account by his endorsement of a Davidson inspired truth-theoretic account of the immediate target of interpretation. The second part of the account may then serve as a partial response to the type
of worry pressed against that account in Foster (1976), in line with the type of response
that Davidson (1976) proposes.
21
It may be that Dummett means to retract this commitment when he argues in later
work that knowledge transmission ‘demands that the channel by which [knowledge] is
transmitted be a normal one; but it does not require that channel to be itself secure.’
(Dummett (1993bb): 426)
22
See e.g. Harman (1973); Ginet (1980); Dretske (1982)—where the label ‘cognitive
cul-de-sacs’ is coined—; Dretske & Yourgrau (1983). I prefer the label ‘epistemic’ to ‘cognitive’, since such cases plausibly involve no difficulty in the preservation of cognition,
but only in the preservation of epistemic status. Typically, the type of cul-de-sac discussed
in the literature is most closely akin to the second type of case presented here.
23
In fact, Evans’ demand is weaker, in effect that the speaker says of something that it is
F as a consequence of knowing of that thing that it is F. The weaker demand is less plausible than the one I consider: it allows that someone might, in ordinary circumstances,
transmit their knowledge that Hesperus shines brightly by saying that Phosphorus shines
brightly, despite their failing to know that Phosphorus shines brightly due, for instance,
to their failing to know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. For discussion of related issues, see
Dummett (1978); Heck (1995).
24
A fourth, more specifically theory-dependent type of putative counterexample arises
from the interaction of Evans’s conditions with accounts of knowledge on which the standards governing its possession are sensitive to specific features of subjects’ practical or
theoretical circumstances. For instance, knowing whether p is of very little (practical or
theoretical) importance to Val, so the standards governing Val’s knowing p are, according
to the views in question, low. Val meets the low standards, so Val knows p. Sal meets the
same low standards as Val. But by contrast with Val, the importance to Sal of knowing
whether p is very high, so that, according to the views in question, the standards governing Sal’s knowing p are very high. Even if Val were to tell Sal p, Sal would fail to meet
his own high standards for knowing p. For more detailed presentation and discussion of
cases of this sort, see MacFarlane (2005).
25
The label derives from Welbourne’s 1983 discussion of so-called cognitive cul-de-sacs.
26
See e.g. Goldberg (2005), Lackey (1999), and MacFarlane (2005) for related cases.
I am not wholly convinced that knowledge is transmitted in such cases. One reason for
doubt is that if the audience’s putative acquisition of knowledge goes via ordinary trust
of the speaker, and acceptance of what they have said, then their cognition is liable to
involve an awful lot of error and ignorance. A second, related reason is that the main
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operative feature of such cases appears to be the reliability of the speaker, when coupled
with compensatory factors. I don’t think that mere reliability of that sort—i.e. absent
the sort of background knowledge that would enable one to use the speaker, or speaker–
coupled-with-compensation, as an instrument—would suffice for knowledge acquisition
by an audience. Even if one were willing to allow that knowledge can be acquired in
this sort of case, it would take further argument to show that such cases are of the same
epistemological type as more normal cases of testimonial knowledge transmission. For
one thing, it might be argued that the source of testimony in such cases is not the speaker—e.g. Sal—but rather the speaker together with the compensating factors—e.g. Sal
and Val. For another, the speaker, or speaker-coupled-with-compensation, appears to
function as an instrument in such transactions, while it is plausible that the epistemology of ordinary cases of knowledge transmission relies upon the speaker functioning as
an epistemic agent: an agent in possession of knowledge, who acts on that knowledge
in speaking as they do. For the importance of distinguishing such cases from other types
of case wherein one can acquire knowledge on the basis of what people say, see Burge
(1993), 1997; Coady (1992): 25-76; Moran (2005); Owens (2000): 165-166, 2006;
Ross (1986); Welbourne (1986).
27
It is an important question whether such cases form a distinctive epistemological
kind. Doubtless, pursuit of that question would demand fuller specification of the putative kind. For pertinent discussion, see the references in the previous footnote.
28
For discussion, see Dancy (2000), 2008; Hornsby (2008); Hyman (1999), 2006;
Roessler (2009); Williamson (2000). Note that the formulation in the text leaves it open
whether reasons only take factual or propositional form.
29
It may, however, be subject to other difficulties, including those brought to prominence by Lewis Carroll 1895.
30
Indeed, failing some such allowance, the Rumfitt’s account would make it impossible
for Sal to understand Val’s saying that Sal’s fly is undone and Sal does not know that
Sal’s fly is undone, since Sal might be in a position to know that what Val said is true,
but couldn’t be in a position to know that which she said.
31
Thus, one might hold that object perception invariably gives rise to perceptual knowledge without viewing its further consequences as over-determined by the conjunction of
perception and knowledge, since the perceptual knowledge is itself dependent upon the
object perception. Similarly, one might hold that understanding invariably gives rise to
propositional knowledge without viewing its further consequences as over-determined.
This is a partial response to a worry pressed by Stephen Schiffer.
32
Compare here Dummett’s 1991: 89-92 discussion of apparent understanding in the
absence of awareness.
33
For pertinent discussion of perceptual epistemology, see Martin (1993); Roessler
(2009).
34
This claim needs careful handling, since we may not wish to rule out the possibility of
factive speech acts—which may include, for example, informing that such-and-such. For
full understanding of such a speech act might be held to involve proper appreciation of its
factiveness, and so thought to require non-neutrality with respect to alethic status. The
response to this concern that I favour involves carefully distinguishing neutrality in one’s
attitudes towards an expressed content—as required by the present argument—from
neutrality of the commitments one takes on through taking those attitudes. Just as I can
accept that Sal knows p without yet accepting p, despite the fact that what I thereby
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accept entails p, so I can accept that Sal has informed Val that p without accepting p,
despite the fact that what I thereby accept entails p.
35
Obviously, an analogous derivation can be constructed with ‘rejects’ in place of ‘accepts’, so I won’t pursue the matter here.
36
Compare e.g. Tyler Burge’s Principle and Stronger Principle for Canonical Names of
Senses (2005: 174ff). A variety of other accounts of our grasp of the content of the
hierarchy would issue in analogous results.
37
For an array of supporting considerations, see Burge (1986); Welbourne (2003),
2007.
38
If we allow that Val nevertheless counts as understanding what Sal said, she can serve
as a counterexample to Rumfitt’s version of (RK): she might understand an utterance
used to say p, and know the utterance to be true, without thereby knowing p.
39
Pagin (2008): 92, which contains a useful defence of the Classical View. It is plausible that Burge also intends to promote this type of model in his 1993, 1997, 1999.
40
See my 2009.
41
See especially Burge 1993.
42
Notice that suitable responsiveness to the assertion/non-assertion alternation would
suffice to underwrite knowledge-transmission even if one were insensitive to finer-grained
distinctions amongst the other forces.
43
I provide a more thorough discussion of this issue in my 2008b, with specific reference to Burge’s account of knowledge-preserving testimony. See also Malmgrem (2006).
44
The following argument is a version of one presented in my 2008a. Notice that, in
the passages quoted above, both Evans and McDowell appeal to hearing and understanding as underwriting knowledge-transmission, rather than appealing only to understanding. It may be that they mean to appeal to an overall account combining elements of
(UK) with their favoured model of understanding per se.
45
This is a sort of analogue of some presentations of Gettier cases, in which the problem case is derived by the following method. One begins by constructing a case in which
the subject does not know because what they believe is false. Then one constructs an
analogous case, in which the subject’s belief is true, but their evidence, or other features
of their perspective on the facts, is the same as in the case where they don’t know. Here, I
began by constructing a case in which the subject does not understand because what they
are acquainted with fails to include an utterance and its content. Then I constructed an
analogous case, in which the latter failure is rectified, without changing any other feature of the subject’s perspective on those objects. From the subject’s perspective, the
second sort of case might as well be a case of the first sort. Martin (2001) presses a related objection against Brewer’s 1999 attempt to construct fact-guaranteeing perception
out of perceptual acquaintance with objects and properties. The analogous problem for
that view is that one might, for instance, be perceptually acquainted with a cube and (an
instance of) the property of being red without that guaranteeing, for one, that the cube
is red, since one might be perceptually acquainted with a blue cube and a red sphere.
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